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Abstract:  
One dominant economic concept in China states that yeomanry is the most efficient and 
equitable land tenure system while tenancy system not only causes landlord to exploit tenant 
farmers but also leads to low production efficiency. However, this paper questions the 
arguments for a yeomanry system. Appling the theory of optimal ownership structure on farms, 
this paper discusses the total surpluses of different land ownership structures, yeomanry, wage 
contract, tenancy (share contract and fixed rental contract), and argues that the optimal land 
ownership structure can vary with the optimal operational scale, technological development, 
land quality, market development, etc. Quantitative analysis shows that in pre-modern China, 
higher tenancy rates appear in places with more developed markets, lower transportation costs, 
larger operational scale of land and smaller average ownership scale of land. In the comparison 
between tenants and yeomen of pre-modern China, tenancy economy shows its advantage in 
many aspects, such as production scale and profits. Reasons of tenancy’s advantage are then 
discussed with the support of some cases.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The dominant economic concept of classical western political economy and contemporary 
Chinese economics states that yeomanry excels tenancy, whether in terms of efficiency or 
equity. In observing Irish agriculture, English classical economist John Stuart Mill (1848) 
defended the efficiency of the yeoman land institution. He argued that the lease of landholdings 
to tenant farmers by the few well-endowed landowners would create widespread poverty due to 
exploitation which would negatively affect the economic efficiency. Mill held that only when 
significant economy of scale exists can yeomanry become an obsolete system in agriculture. 
Swiss classical economist Jean Charles Léonard de Sismondi, in his 1819 treatise The New 
Principles of Political Economy, also expressed his high opinion of yeomanry. Sismondi stated 
that “wherever there is yeomanry, there is comfort, safety, confidence toward future and sense 
of independence, therefore happiness and morality are maintained.”1 
The “land to the tiller” motto has been the aspiration for Chinese peasants for centuries and it 
survived as the dominant ideology from Republic of China to now. Chinese scholars commonly 
share three views on the yeomanry ideology. Firstly, “land to the tiller” promotes maximal 
security for farmers. These scholars consider tenants as factors of social instability, who are 
usually forcibly reduced into this socio-economic status. Some assume that the level of 
prosperity of the yeomanry function as the indicator of traditional society’s rise and fall. 
Secondly, scholars assume that the relative lack of tax and burdens of the yeoman compared to 
the tenant encourages higher enthusiasm of production, and that freedom and flexibility of 
yeoman production made positive impacts on agricultural technology. Thirdly, exploitation of 
tenants by landlords hindered the development of the pre-modern Chinese economy.2 The 
above mentioned views contribute to the Chinese people’s fear of tenancy; that land rentals will 
create precarious livelihood for farmers. Thus, the Chinese government has been cautious in the 
liberalization of agricultural lands’ transfers.  
However, in reality, tenancy system has played an important role in Chinese economic history. 
It not only coexisted with yeomanry in pre-modern China, but also became the dominant land 
operation mode in many economically developed areas. This paper discusses and validates the 
prosperity of pre-modern Chinese tenancy system historically and explains the phenomenon 
with institutional economic theory. The second part of this paper will introduce enterprise’s 
optimal ownership structure theory to analyze the factors that influence land right structure. The 
third part tests the influence of return of land investment and land scale on the tenancy rate. The 
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 Sismondi (1964) mentioned that: yeomen have the highest productivity among all kinds of tillers, because they 
plan the most and have the most experience. ...... In the meantime, in places where tenant system is implemented, 
lands can feed the highest population than other places, but the fertility of land can still maintain. At last, within all 
kinds of tillers, yeomen have the most incentive effect to business, because they are the richest.  
2
 Hou Jianxin (2006) argues that Chinese landlords can use their privilege to cast about increasing tenants' 
payment, so tenants are always in disadvantage. Therefore agricultural capitalism was hard to come into being in 
pre-modern China, and modernization progress was blocked. 
   Journal of Cambridge Studies 
3 
fourth part will compare real economic efficiencies of tenancy and yeomanry through several 
indexes. The fifth part explains the reason of tenancy’s predominance. 
2. EXPLANATION OF THE CHOICES OF FARM LAND OWNERSHIP 
STRUCTURE 
Institutional economists explain the choice of land system via transaction costs. Some scholars, 
Steven N.S. Cheung (1969), Joseph E. Stiglitz (1974), Peng Meiyu(2004), etc., drew similar 
conclusions through different ways. When ignoring the transaction costs, yeomanry, hired 
laborer, share contract and fixed rental contract and other contractual arrangements have same 
efficiency in resource allocation; when taking transaction costs into account, optimal contract 
arrangement differs under different transactional efficiency, production function, prices of 
factors and risks.  
Enterprise ownership theory, based on transaction cost theory, discusses the efficiency of 
resource allocation under different ownership structures and the determination of optimal 
ownership structure. Within this theory, tenants can be categorized as a type of farm 
entrepreneurs (Long Denggao, Peng Bo, 2010)3. The enterprise optimal ownership structure 
theory can be applied to the analysis of tenant farm enterprise. 
By regarding each farm as an enterprise, one can assess an array of ownership structures each 
with a specific economic relation between landlords and tenants4. Harold Demsetz (1999) 
discussion on factors influencing enterprise’s ownership structure, there are three factors that 
determine the ownership structure of a farm enterprise. The first factor is the land scale needed 
for the maximization of a farm’s value. Increasing the scales of operation can lower production 
cost, but increase supervision and management cost; an optimal scale of minimal overall cost 
exists as equilibrium between the two poles. Therefore the larger the optimal operational scale 
of land, the less likely that a single farmer will operate the entire enterprise, and more likely 
that tenancy system will prevail. The second factor is that the profit potential derives from 
effective on-site control (potential control of farm operator’s behaviors). The third factor is 
macroscopic and systematic control by the reigning government.  
Oliver Hart (1995) discusses the enterprise’s optimal ownership structure through total surplus 
of institutional arrangement. In equilibrium, each economic relationship will result in an 
ownership structure with the highest total surplus. Regarding different farms as different 
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 Both landlords and tenants can be seen as entrepreneurs. Tenants are not only labor providers, but also managers 
of farm enterprises. They can interact with market flexibly and adjust their resource allocation, production scale 
and production method according to their judgment and decision.  
4
 Long Denggao, Peng Bo (2009) put forward that 1) under fixed-rent contract, tenants organize production and 
bear risk on their own, the rent is the price by which tenants purchase land usage right. 2) Under shared contract, 
landlords and tenants are cooperating. 3) Under wage contract landlords organize production and bear risk on their 
own, and hired labors' income is the price by which landlords purchase labors.  
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enterprises, according to Hart’s theory, we assume M1 and M2 to be two farmers, and assume 
the following three kinds of resources: 
a1: Land ownership right 
a2: Land control right 
a3: Labor 
In the initial status, there are three following kinds of resource allocation: 
1) Wage contract: M1 owns a1, a2. M2 owns a3. M1 need to hire M2, and the hiring cost is w. 
In this situation, the investment of land will only be done by landlords. Suppose the investment 
of M1 toward land is i0, and the revenue is R(i0). Transactional cost is T05. Then the reward 
afterward of M1 is R(i0)-w-i0. Suppose the labor cost paid by M2 is C0, then the reward 
afterward of M2 is w-C0. 
In this situation, the total surplus of M1 and M2 is S0=R(i0)-w-i0-S0+w-C0=R(i0)-i0-T0-C0. 
2) Tenancy: M1 owns a1, M2 owns a2 and a3, i.e. M1 is the landlord and M2 is the tenants. M2 
costs P to purchase a2. There are two situation of tenancy: post distribution of surplus (share 
contract), and prior distribution of surplus (fixed rental contract). 
1. Post-distribution of surplus. The percentage of rent is t. Under this situation, both M1 and 
M2 have the impetus of investing the land. Suppose M1 invests i1 into the land, and pays 
transaction cost T1. M2 invest e2 into the land. Then the total revenue of land is R(i1+e1). The 
reward afterward of M1 is t·R（i1+e1）+P-i1-T1. Suppose the labor cost of M2 is C1, then the 
reward afterward of M2 is (1-t)·R（i1+e1）-P-e1-C1. The total surplus of M1 and M2 is S1=R（
i1+e1）-i1-e1-T1-C1.  
The optimal investment choice of landlords and tenants are governed by the following 
considerations. In the situation of free exchange and M1 and M2 can coordination their 
behaviors, they have the common interest to maximize the net present value of the total surplus 
in their economic relation. The reason lies on, given any investment (i, e) that cannot maximize 
the present value of the total surplus, both sides can always find a (i, e) that can maximize the 
present value of total surplus and make an one-off payment transfer at time 0 to increase the 
welfare of both. Use（i*，e*） to represent the only optimal solution, the first-order condition 
of maximizing total surplus S=R(i+e)-i-e-T-C is： 
R(i*+e*)/ i*=1
R(i*+e*)/ *=1e
 
 
                （1） 
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 Transaction cost includes search cost (information cost) , negotiation cost, supervision cost, etc. It not only refers 
to cost in terms of money, but also in terms of time and energy. 
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2. Pre-distribution of surplus. The present value of fixed rent is R. Usually in these 
circumstances. Only landlord will invest on the land. Suppose the transaction cost of landlord is 
S2; M2 invest e2 to the land; the total revenue of the land is R(e2); the labor cost of M2 is C1. 
Then the reward afterward of M1 is R-T2. The reward afterward of M2 is R(e2)-e2-C2-R. The 
total surplus of M1 and M2 is：S2=R(e2)-e2-T2-C2 
3) Yeomanry: M2 owns a1, a2, a3, i.e. M2 has purchased land from landlord. The cost of 
buying a1 and a2 is P', and the transaction cost is T3. The investment of M2 to the land is e3. 
The total revenue of land is R(e3). The labor cost of M2 is C3. Then the total surplus of M1 and 
M2 is S3=R(e3)-e3-C3-P'+P'=R(e3)-e3-T3-C3. 
The theory of property right predicts that the optimal ownership structure is the one that 
maximizes the total surplus, i.e. under equilibrium statues, comparing functions (2)~(5), the 
ownership structure that brings the highest value of S will be selected by market.  
S0=R(i0)-i0-T0-C0                          （2） 
S1=R(i1+e1)-i1-e1-T1-C1                  （3） 
S2=R(e2)-e2-T2-C2                         （4） 
S3=R(e3)-e3-T3-C3                         （5） 
Seen from the functions above, which ownership structure will be dominant depends on the 
relative value of i and e (The willing investment of the landlord and the farmer), R (the reward 
correspondently), T (The cost of landlord’s supervision and transaction between landlord and 
tenants or hired labor), and C (The labor cost needed for tilling) 
Transaction cost will rise with the rising of the risk that landlords face, therefore T0>T1>T2>T3. 
In fixed ownership structure, the transaction cost will rise in three situations: 1) when the 
optimal operational land scale increases, 2) when the landlord gets far away from his land and 
becomes hard to supervise his land, or 3) when the deficiency of active land market raises the 
cost of searching information of both sides. In the reign of Qing Emperor Yong Zheng, farmer 
Jin Xiuzhang, Fengxian County, Jiangsu Province, leased his land to Lu Shangyu and became a 
landlord. Then because Lu “owed rice rent and did not repay”, the supervision cost and dunning 
cost and risk of Jin increased. Therefore Jin got back his land, tilled it himself and became a 
yeoman again. (“Hsingkwa Teben”6 No.178). We can simply regard transaction cost the 
function of A (land scale), D (distance between landlord’s habitation and his land), M (the 
activity of land transaction market). Then T=T(A, D, M). 
In addition, land operational scale (A), technical level (L), geographic elements (G) (such as the 
character of land, the climate, etc.) the mobility and marketability of agricultural products (F) 
influence the revenue function R(i, e). In the reign of Qing Emperor Qian Long, farmer Qiao 
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Zihui, Zhong Zhuang village, Taiwan, found himself “Lack of strength to till”, so leased his 
own wasteland to someone who was more capable to operate the land. ( Hong Liwan, 2002, 
Page 205). This transaction improved the technical skill on this land, changed the revenue 
function, therefore increased the total surplus of both sides. Theoretically, land system and 
other conditions fixed, a farmer will maximize his interest by a best investment, which means 
that i and e are endogenetic. Then R=R(A, L, G, F). 
The labor cost (including opportunity cost) depends on the maximum revenue one can get from 
other available occupation. Suppose the labor’s maximum marginal income in nonagricultural 
field is U, we have C=C(U). During the reign of Qing Emperor Guang Xu, aboriginal resident 
A Laowansilao of Nanpu village in Taiwan leased his formerly self-tilling land to Huang 
Jiangli, a Han Chinese, because A Laowansilao “lacks strength to reclaim and till the land, and 
in any case moved to a faraway place”(Hong Liwan, 2002, Page 207). One reason drove this 
farm from a yeomanry farm to a tenant farm was that the cost of self-tilling became too high 
since landlord moved distance from the land.  
Therefore, the optimal land right structure S can be simply regarded as depending on A, D, M, 
L, G, F, U. that is:  
 0 1 2 3S~S(A, D, M, L, G, F, U) ,    S S , S , S , S       （6） 
It is obvious that, under different conditions, the optimal land ownership structure can be 
different, and yeomanry is not always the best. The following passage will use historical 
statistics to discuss two set of factors influencing the selection of land ownership structure: 1) 
the mobility and marketability of agricultural products, and 2) land scales. 
3. FACTORS INFLUENCING THE SELECTION OF LAND RIGHT 
STRUCTURE 
3.1 The return on land investment 
Though investment return on land is usually lower than on urban industries, the low risk makes 
land sometimes a better investment choice. As the most stable asset, land has the character of 
“Peace of mind from fire and water hazards, safety from burglary and robbery." The price of 
land has long-term upward tendency because of its scarcity, but the demand of agricultural 
products is relatively stable in a certain time. Therefore under private land ownership system, 
with the accumulation of urban commercial capital, land became an investment good that 
provide reliable earnings and long-term security.  
D.H.Perkins (1969) considered the main cause of the tenancy rates' regional difference in China 
as the volume of investment from people out of village (“Absent landlords”). In 1930s, within 
the tenant lands all over China, those owned by absent landlords had a proportion of 3/4 on 
average. (D.H. Perkins, 1969, Page 117). The funding of absent landlords were usually from 
non-agricultural industries, so there were mainly two factors determining the volume of 
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investment from absent landlords: 1) the advancement of non-agricultural industries; 2) the 
attraction of land investment, i.e. the returning rate. According to CIESR(1939)’s investigation, 
in Wuxing County, different land investment returns in different areas caused tenancy rates’ 
distinction. Those areas more favorable on land investment had more developed tenancy. On 
the contrary, the area of Yuanjiahui had the lowest tenancy rate because of “low terrain, barren 
fields, and narrow market”. 
There are two factors that influence the land investment return. One is agricultural products’ 
commercialization, impacted by transportation’s convenience and market's development level. 
Zhao Gang(1997) put forward that market is the prerequisite of land tenancy system. The tenant 
land system developed because landlords were able to commercialize land rent incomes 
(originally as a way to resolve the conflict between total dependency on income from farm 
production and diversity of consumption demands). The other is lands’ productivity. Li Deying 
(2006) studied tenancy in counties of Chengdu Plain and discovered that tenancy rates were 
well related to geographic locations and land quality. Areas that had fertile lands and were close 
to cities had high tenancy rates, while remote areas had lower tenancy rates. Xia Mingfang 
(2000) argues that the development of tenancy in one area had close relation to its ecological 
environment. Fertile lands and abundant products gave rise to high land investment return, thus 
gave rise to developed tenancy system. Areas with barren lands usually had more yeomen.  
In Figure 1, the relation between tenancy rates and commercialization degrees in 17 counties in 
Republic of China shows that those areas with more developed agricultural market were more 
attractive to landlords’ investment. The commercialization degrees in south areas were higher 
than in north areas. Transportation cost of agricultural products was one important factor that 
influenced the commercialization degree and return of investment. Figure 2 shows that except 
for Jiangxi and Jiangsu7, the transportation costs and tenancy rates had negative correlation in 
all paddy areas. The lower the transportation cost was, the higher the land investment return 
was, and thus the higher the tenancy rate would be.  
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 There are only three counties in Jiangsu that had integrated data, with on apparent trend. The five counties in 
Jiangxi were regionalized into two regions and also show no trend. 
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Resource: John L.Buck, 1936 
Figure 1 The relation between tenancy rates and commercialization degrees of 17 counties 
in 1921~1925 China 
 
 
 
 
Resource: John L.Buck, 1937 
Figure 2 The costs of transporting agricultural products to out of town and the tenancy 
rates 
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3.2 The scale of land ownership and the scale of land operation 
The scale of land ownership and the scale of land operation have different mechanism of 
changing. Both of them are essential factors that influence tenancy rates (Will be discussed in 
Chapter IV). Suppose the dispersion degree (i.e. ownership scale owned by each landlord on 
average) is Ar, and the average operational scale per farm is A. If Ar>A, the ratio of tenant land 
to total land is (Ar-A)/Ar. If Ar<A, the ratio of tenant land to total land is (A-Ar)/A. Then the 
tenancy rate of land Tr can be shown as: 
 
 
Other condition fixed, if land ownership scale is more dispersed than land operational scale, 
tenancy rates have negative correlation to the dispersion degree of land right, and have positive 
correlation to the land operational scale, because tenancy plays the role of concentrating 
dispersed land. If land ownership scale is more concentrated than land operational scale, the 
more concentrated land right is, the higher the tenancy rate will be, because land right owner is 
not capable to till the extra land beyond his ability.  
Figure 4 and Figure 5 shows the relations between tenancy rates and land ownership scales in 
16 Chinese provinces in 1920s. In general, tenancy rates were negatively correlated to average 
ownership scale per landlord, while in southern China; the negative correlation was greater 
because of the more concentrated land ownership.  
 
Resources: "Adjusted tenancy rates" 8is from Zhao Gang, 2005, Page 73; "Cultivated land 
owned by each landlord" is from Statistical Bureau, Accounting and Statistics, National 
Government, 1936, Page 469-483 
Figure 3 Tenancy rates and land ownership dispersion (Data from R. China Statistical 
Summary) 
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 "Adjusted tenancy rate" refers to the rate of original tenancy eliminating permanent lease. 
Tr = （7） (Ar-A)/Ar    Ar>A 
(A-Ar)/A     Ar<A 
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Resource: Land Commission, 1937, Page 36. 1 Mu = 0.15 Are 9 
Figure 4 Tenancy rates and land right dispersion (Data from Investigation Report 
Compendium on Land) 10 
As to operational scales, according to the following figure, the tenancy rates of both Wheat 
Areas and Paddy Areas had positive correlation with land operational scales per labor. The 
positive correlation was higher in Wheat Areas than in Paddy Areas. According to Function (7), 
these positive correlations show that the land ownership distributions were more dispersed than 
operational scales in Pre-modern China.  
 
Figure 5 Land Operational Scales Each Labor and Tenancy Rates 
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 "Are" is a unit of land area. One Are = 100 sq. m. 
10
 The data is from Buck (1937, Page 57~59 and Page 298) Wheat areas include Gansu, Ningxia, Qinghai, North 
Shaanxi, Suiyuan, Shanxi, Hebei, Shandong, North Jiangsu, North Henan, North Anhui. Paddy areas include South 
Anhui, South Henan, South Shaanxi, jiangxi, Zhejiang, Hunan, Sichuan, Hubei, Guangxi, Yunnan, Guizhou, 
Guangdong, Fujian.  
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4. THE COMPARISON OF EFFICIENCY BETWEEN YEOMANRY AND 
TENANCY 
In the traditional understanding, the formation of land tenancy was because of farmers' 
reluctantly losing their lands in hardship time. Given this point stands, the tenancy rates must 
be higher in those places where the natural calamities were more serious, and productivity 
lower. However, that was not the case. The figure below shows that the tenancy rates (The 
percentage of tenants and semi-tenants) was much higher in developed areas than in less 
developed areas.  Northern China, where the economy was relatively backward, had the least 
tenancy rate, while southern China, where the economy was more advanced, had higher 
tenancy rates. 
 
Source: Accounting and Statistics, National Government, 1937, Page 330 
Figure 6 Percentage of tenant farmers to all the farmers: 193611 
This tendency could also be seen in single areas. Areas with advanced economy usually had 
more developed tenancy system. According to Table 1, among the four areas in Wuxing County 
of Zhejiang, Yuanjiahui had the most backward agricultural economy, and the highest ratio of 
yeomen. Nanxun was the most advanced area, and the tenancy system of it was the most 
developed, with only 8.72% of all farmers being yeomen and other nearly 90% being tenant or 
semi-tenant farmers.  
Table 1  Percentage of Yeomen, Semi-tenant Farmers and Tenant Farmers in 4 Areas in 
Wu Xing County 
Areas Yeomen 
Semi-tenant 
Farmers 
Tenant Farmers 
Na Xun 8.72% 82.56% 5.81% 
Ling Hu 33.64% 58.88% 2.34% 
Shuang Xiu 55.56% 40.43% 0.31% 
Yuan Juahui 58.38% 35.53% 1.52% 
Resource：CIESR(1939) 
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 Provinces from left to right in turn are: Inner Mongolia and Northwest (Chahar, Suiyuan, Ningxia, Qinghai), 
Northern China (Gansu, Shaanxi, Shanxi, Hebei, Shandong, Henan), Central and Southern China (Jiangsu, Anhui, 
Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong, Jiangxi, Hubei, Hunan, Guangxi, Sichuan, Yunnan, Guizhou) 
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Another example is Guixian Town, Danyang County in Jiangsu. It was the wealthiest town 
among the 11 areas in Danyang and had the highest productivity in most kinds of agricultural 
products. It also had the highest proportion of well-off farmer families in Danyang. In the mean 
time, Gui Xian's tenancy rate were the highest in Danyang. 65 percent of farmers are tenant and 
semi-tenant farmers, which was much higher than any other places in Danyang (Zhang Hanlin, 
1920, Page 789-835). Xuxi had the highest agricultural productivity among all the 5 areas of 
Jiaxing County in Zhejiang, while the percentage of tenant and semi-tenant farmers were 
94.82%, mush higher than other 4 areas (Feng Zigang, 1936, Page 236). 
Compared to yeomanry, tenancy system excelled in following two aspects. 
1. The scale of labor and farm land 
John L.Buck (1936) was engaged in a investigation and statistic toward the rent categories, 
farm areas, family scales, returns, land prices and working efficiency etc. of 2866 farms in 17 
counties of 7 provinces in China. Comparing family manpower and farm scales among yeomen, 
semi-tenant farmers, and tenant farmers, we have the results as Table 2 (the numbers of counted 
farms as weight number): 
In Table 2, "Farm Area" means the whole farm land, including cultivated lands and all the other 
lands belonging to farm owners. "Crop Are" is a unit measuring the total Ares of land 
harvesting all kinds of crops in all seasons in a year. (For example, if there is one Are of land 
which harvests two seasons of crops. Then this land is counted as 2 Crop Ares.) Labors of 
different ages and genders are represented with the amount of adult males through Atwater's 
Scale. (For example a lady in the age of 15~16 can be represented as 0.8 unit of adult male) 
(John L.Buck,1936, Page 19). The advantage of this kind of statistics is that the amounts of 
production factors are standardized and become easy to compare.  
Table 2 The Comparison of Land Operational Scales and labors Among Yeomen, 
semi-tenant farmers and tenant farmers (Source: "Chinese Farm Economy") 
 
15 Counties on Average 7 Counties in Northern China 
8 Counties in Central and 
Eastern China 
Yeomen 
semi-tenant 
farmers 
Tenant 
farmers 
Yeomen 
semi-tenant 
farmers 
Tenant 
farmers 
Yeomen 
semi-tenant 
farmers 
Tenant 
farmers 
Family 
Scales 
4.38 4.52 4.33 4.44 4.56 5.74 4.33 4.47 3.98 
Farm Areas 39.39 35.04 61.78 44.82 41.86 134.84 33.28 27.86 29.23 
Crop Areas 
each person 
25.15 26.06 34.44 30.07 29.47 64.24 19.62 22.47 21.16 
The unit of "Family Scales" is "Adult Male Unit". The unit of "Farm Areas" is "Local Mu"(One Local Mu = 0.15 Are)  
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Viewing the whole nation, there was no significant difference in the family labor scale among 
yeomen, semi-tenant farmers and tenant farmers. In north, tenant families had more manpower 
on average, while in south, the semi-tenant families. Regarding farm scale, yeomen had the 
least Crop Are per labor in both Northern and Southern parts. Table 3 shows that semi-tenant 
farmers had the largest household sizes in the Northern, Southern or the entire nation. 
Table 3  The average household sizes of farmers 
 Yeomen Semi-tenant farmers Tenant Farmers 
Entire China 5.38 5.68 4.76 
Northern China 5.55 5.83 4.97 
Southern China 5.12 5.61 4.74 
Source: Hou Yangfang, 2001, Page 515 
Table 4 shows the manpower and land scale of each farmer family in four south counties in 
1930s. Through these specific areas, we can also see that semi-tenant farmers had the largest 
sizes of family and areas of land on average (Jiaxing's tenant farmers had the largest size) 
Table 4  The average household sizes and land scales of farmers in four counties 
Area 
The average household sizes Land operational scales（Mu） 
Yeomen 
semi-tenant 
farmers 
Tenant 
Farmers 
Yeomen 
semi-tenant 
farmers 
Tenant 
Farmers 
Kunyang, Yunnan（1932） 5.6 6 5 10.6 11.2 4.8 
Wuxing, Zhejiang(1938) 4.76 5.17 4.47 6.11 10.01 9.15 
Jiaxing, Zhejiang（1936) 3.3712 3.68 3.5 11.44 10.98 11.75 
Danyang, Jiangsu（1930)    10.6 11.2 4.8 
Source: Su Rujiang, 1932; CIESR, 1939; Feng Zigang, 1936; Zhang Hanlin, 1930 
Li Deying (2008) has drawn to a similar conclusion to the tenant operation in Wenjiang County 
of Sichuan in the period of the Republic of China. The average farm areas and crop areas of 
tenant farmers were apparently larger than yeomen and semi-tenant farmers, and the soil quality 
of tenant farms were better than yeoman farms in general. "The average land value per Mu of 
yeomen was 434 yuan, while that of tenant farmers was 502 yuan. That was because tenant 
farmers were usually willing to rent upper level lands." (Li Deying, 2009) 
As to Northern China, Shi Jianyun (1998) had found similar tendency in the study of tenant 
operation in Northern China. The statistical conclusion of John L.Buck (1937) was that the 
farm operational areas of tenant farmers in Northern China (including semi-tenant farmers) 
were larger than yeomen. Within tenant farmers, the operational scales of semi-tenant farmers 
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were higher than pure tenant farmers. Another instance is the investigation to the areas along 
the Pinghan Railway in 1930s. In the 34 investigated spot in Hebei and Henan along the 
Pinghan Railway, eliminating the great families which owned lands of more than 100 Mu, each 
yeoman operated 2.92 Mu of land on average, and each tenant or semi-tenant farmer 3.13 Mu.  
2. Earnings and profits 
Making a weighted average to the incomes and profits of yeomen, semi-tenant farmers and 
tenant farmers in different areas (data from "Chinese Farm Economy"), we can see that tenant 
farmers had highest operational efficiency, while semi-tenant farmers the second and yeomen 
the lowest. The Farm Labor Earning and profits per Crop Are of tenant farmers were greater 
than that of yeomen and semi-tenant farmers. In Wutai County of Shanxi, the Farm Labor 
Earning per tenant farm was even three times greater than that per yeoman farm, because of the 
method of "enterpriseal tenant cultivation" prevailed at that time13. From the Operator's Labor 
Earning, tenant farmers had the highest labor efficiency.  
Table 5 The Comparison of the earnings and profits (Yuan)14 
 
15 counties on average 7 counties in North 8 counties in East and Center 
Yeomen Semi-tenants  Tenants Yeomen Semi-tenants Tenants Yeomen semi-tenants Tenants 
Farm Labor 
Earning 
104.7 111.9 181.4 78.6 80.9 208.6 141.2 144.7 169.3 
Operator’s 
Labor Earning 
103.8 114.9 140.4 78.5 83.1 95.5 139.2 148.3 160.5 
profits per 
Crop Are 
1.5 1.6 3.0 0.1 0.4 1.0 2.6 3.1 4.3 
Comparing the net profit per Are of three kinds of farmers in the five areas in Jiaxing County, 
the semi-tenant farmers were the highest in three areas while the yeomen highest in the other 
two.  
                                                         
13
 The Farm Labor Earning of Wutai Shanxi of Tenants is 392.91 yuan, while that of yeomen is 103.15 yuan.  
14
 "Farm Labor Earning" means the sum of tenants' earning and landlords' earning. It can reflect lands' operational 
efficiency. "Operator" means the farmer engaging in real operation of farm. "Operator's Labor Earning" means the 
annual income of operators, that is Farm Labor Earning minus Landlord's earning.   
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Table 6 Net profits per Are in the five areas in Jiaxing county (Yuan) 
 Yuxi Town Taian Village Baoda Village 
Hannan 
Village 
Tantang 
Village 
Yeomen 3.19 2.6 2.54 1.92 4.16 
Semi-tenant farmers 4.52 2.78 2.42 2.71 3.82 
Tenant famers 4.35 2.47 2.17 1.62 4.01 
Source: Feng Zigang, 1936, Page 537-541 
According to Li Deying (2008)'s comparison of the earnings and profits of different kinds of 
farms in Chengdu Plain in the period of Republic of China, if the opportunity cost, of which 
yeomen using the land of their own, is counted (that is counting the investment interests of land 
as expenses), tenant farmers had much more abundant profit than yeomen. Farm Operator 
Earning per tenant farmer in ten counties in Chengdu Plain was 927 yuan, while that per 
yeomen was 639 yuan. Pure profits per Mu were 20.28 yuan for tenant farmers and 12.61 for 
Yeomen. That is to say, for a tiller who owned no land at that time, renting a land was more 
profitable than buying one, even though he may have enough capital to purchase land. This can 
be verified by the relation between the well-being condition and tenant land proportion. 
According to traditional view, farmers tend to purchase lands while their wealthes grow, and 
only farmers too poor to buy land will rent lands. However, historical materials show that 
sometimes renting lands was a better choice than buying lands. One example is Baiquan 
County and Yushu County in Northeast China, "rich farmers" and "middle farmers" had much 
more renting land than "poor farmers", and the former two had the highest areas of tenant land 
per family. Measuring the well-being level by land ownership, with the increasing of wealth, 
the areas of tenant lands were not always decreasing, but always increasing instead. In Baiquan 
County, the percentage of tenant lands was higher for "middle farmers" than for "poor farmers". 
In Yushu County, that percentage was higher for "wealthy farmers" than for "middle farmers". 
(Propaganda Department, Northeast Bureau, 1949, Page 19-44). Also, according to the 
investigation in Henan Province in 1933, in the four villages of Hui County, 48.6 percent of 
rich farmers rented land, while 15.9 percent of middle farmers and 35.6 percent of poor farmer 
rented land. In five villages of Xuchang, that percentage was 30.4% of rich farmers and 15.4% 
and 26.7% of middle and poor farmers. In six villages in Zhenping, that percentage of rich, 
medium and poor farmers were 58.3%, 55.8% and 30.9%. (Rural Reconstruction Committee, 
1934, Page 59-61) 
5. REASONS FOR TENANCY SYSTEM'S ADAPTABILITY AND 
DOMINANCE 
1. Tenant system separates land's functions of capital and production factor and realizes the 
division between investors and users (Long Denggao, 2008). In the contracts of Ba County in 
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Sichuan, Cao Zhenglong, who was in need of money, pawned his land to Cousin Cao 
Zhengting for 102 taels of silver in the February of 1814. In the mean time, Cao Zhenglong 
signed another contract with Cao Zhengting to rent the same land to till with the annual rent of 
5 qian15. Then the functions of capital and production factor of land were separated. This 
transaction equals to that Cao Zhenglong gained a loan with annual interest rate of 0.5% 
through land mortgage, and he himself keep the tilling right of the land. The loan interest rate 
was much lower with land mortgage than loan without mortgage. The similar contract cases in 
Ba County were as following: 
Table 7   Contract cases in Ba County, in which lands were pawned and rented back 
Date 
Pawner, 
tenant 
Pawnee, 
lessor 
Pawn price Annual rent 
Equal to annual 
loan interest rate 
1800.8 
Zhu 
Yonghong 
Yang 
Guanghe 
100 taels 20 dan16 paddy  10%17 
1807.12 He Yuexing Li Xinhua 90 taels 12 dan paddy 7% 
1830.2 Kuang Zhao 
He 
Yonggang 
48 taels，deposit 2 
taels 
2 taels 4% 
1838.3 Yuan Ze Xie Sisen 4000 wen18 800 wen 20% 
If lands are not allowed to rent, the only way for farmers to gain land is to purchase then, which 
would largely increase the threshold of tilling lands, and when farmers need financing to meet 
their urgent need, they can only sell their land.  
Landlords and tenant farmers have different factor endowments. Tenant farmers have more 
manpower and capability to organizing the production, but relatively lack capital to buy land 
and tools. Landlords have more abundant capital, but their farm experiences are usually less 
than tenants. Yeomen have to manage capital and labor as well, but tenants and landlords can 
exert their factor endowments through various forms of enterprise. Therefore tenant system 
lowers tenants' investment burden and increase landlords' investment willing.  
2. Tenant system optimizes the land operational scale. 
Zhao Gang (1997, Page 53) put forward that one advantage of tenant system is that it increases 
the flexibility of production system and optimize the operational scale. In middle ages Europe, 
the scales of farm land right were usually large, but under the ancient technique, small farms 
were more efficient than large farms, so land owners were willing to transfer large land into 
                                                         
15
 “qian”: a Chinese unit of money 
16
 “dan”: a Chinese unit measuring volumes of crops. 1 dou is about 70 kg. 
17
 Estimated by 0.5 taels per Dan paddy (the price estimation comes from cases of Hsingkwa Teben No. 181 and 
No.204 
18
 “wen”: a Chinese unit of copper coin 
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many small farms operated by different tenant farmers. (Zhao Gang, 1997, Page 53). In 
pre-modern China, the scales of land keep on changing in two different ways. 1) The scale of 
land ownership was more and more dispersed, because of the emerging of absent landlords, 
population burden, and the scarcity of land and the tradition of partible inheritance. (Ye 
Chunhui, 2008). The other is the changing of land operational scale. The optimal operational 
scale is determined by production cost and transaction cost. Enlarging land operational scale 
will on one hand decrease the average production cost due to scale effect (As APC in Figure 7), 
on the other hand will produce more contracts and frictions in land transaction, labor hiring and 
choosing of production manners, which brings more transaction costs (As ATC in Figure 7). 
The optimal operational scale is the one that causes the minimum sum of production cost and 
transaction cost.  
The long-term small farm operation in Chinese history is the balancing between the two (See 
A0 in Figure 7). With the progressing of modern agricultural technology and information 
technology, the ideal farm operational scale is increasing (Zhao Liang, 2008) (As A1 in Figure 
7). When optimal operational scale exceeds ownership scale, tenant system would exert its 
reversed flexibility. Small landlords can lease their lands to big tenants to form big farms, so 
that advanced agricultural technique can be used fully. We can see that there is big difference 
between effective systems of the land ownership scale and land operational scale, and tenant 
system enables land operational scale always tend to be optimal, not be restricted by the 
changing of land ownership scale (See Figure 8). Japanese economist Yujiro Hayami (2000) 
studied Japanese agriculture and pointed out that farmers' strong attachment to land and the 
appreciation expect of land make it impossible to enlarge farm operational scale through land 
ownership transaction. The only way to enlarge operational scale is through developing land 
leasing market. In other word, without tenancy system, land operational scale will be restricted 
by land ownership scale, which will cause the loss of production efficiency.  
 
3. "Good land chooses good tenant”: tenant system realizes the selection of tillers. 
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Another important reason for tenant farmers' higher efficiency than yeomen is that tenancy 
system itself is the selection of land operators. Yeomen with higher operation ability will 
choose to enlarge the operational scale with the accumulation of their capital and production 
factors, either renting land to become tenant farmers or semi-tenant farmers, or buy more land 
to become landlords if the labor is limited. This view can be verified in CIESR(1939)'s field 
survey in Wuxing county, Zhejiang province. "Yeomen with enterprise but lack financing to 
acquire assets would usually rent land and turn to semi-tenant farmers." (CIESR, 1939, Page 
751). Therefore in yeomen, those good at farming would gradually depart from this group and 
those not good at farming had to maintain this status, or even lost their land and become hired 
labors. By this token, semi-tenant farmers and tenant farmers were a group usually had more 
land operation ability than yeomen group. 
A case in point is a Taiwan aboriginal inhabitant Mao Laowei's land transactions in the 36 years 
of 1762-1798. In the years of 1792 and 1783 he bought wasteland several times, but because he 
lacked farming ability, he had not become wealthy through farming, but he could not even 
make ends meet. Then he had to sell his land surface right or lease his land to more capable 
tenants. During 1782 to 1798 he had done 15 times of transactions, including 2 times of selling 
land surface right, 3 times of leasing land, 7 times of pawning land, and 6 times of borrowing 
money (Hong Liwan, 2002). Under tenancy system, farmers with higher capability of farming 
were gradually selected to engage in land operation, which was just "good lands select good 
tenants". Farmers with less capability of farming would gradually leave tillers' group, then the 
distribution of production factors tend to be more in reason. 
Table 8  Taiwan aboriginal inhabitant Mao Laowei's land transactions during 1762-1798 
Contract 
year 
Main context of 
contract 
Cause of contract 
Term of 
years 
Cost of transaction 
1762 Buy wasteland 
Seller needs farm 
cattle 
permanent One cow and one calf 
1762 Buy wasteland Seller needs money permanent 5 yuan 3 hao silver 
1783 Buy wasteland 
Seller needs farm 
cattle 
permanent One cow and one calf 
1783 Pawn water land Short of money 1 year 
200 yuan silver, add 3 dou19 of 
millet every yuan 
1786 Pawn land 
Short of money and 
food 
3 years 100 yuan silver, 40 dan millet 
1790 Sell field surface Short of money permanent 39 yuan silver 
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 “dou”: a Chinese unit measuring volumes of crops. 1 dan is about 7 kg.  
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1791 
Sell water land 
surface 
Short of money permanent 36 yuan silver 
1791 Lease wasteland Incapable to till 10 years 
First three years cultivate virgin 
soil, 25 dan millet the third year, 
30 dan the fifth year, 36 dan 
annual rent since the sixth year 
1792 Lease wasteland 
Tenant asks 
intermediary to 
come 
8 years 
10 yuan silver, 1000 wen of 
annual tax 
1793 
Pawn field（Jiaoli 
woodland） 
Short of money Not defined 120 yuan silver, without interest 
1795 
 
Pawn wasteland 
Short of money 8 years 10 yuan silver 
1795 
Add price for 
pawned field
（Jiaoli 
woodland） 
Short of money Not defined 15 yuan silver 
1798 Lease land 
Land too narrow to 
till 
7 years 1 yuan silver, 8 dou millet 
1798 
Add price for 
pawned field
（Jiaoli 
woodland） 
Short of money Not defined 45 yuan silver 
6. CONCLUSION 
In a free market, the land ownership structure with the highest institutional surplus will be 
dominant. Total institutional surplus is determined by land transaction cost, return function of 
land investment, labor cost of farming, etc. Because these factors have great differences in 
different areas, land ownership structure should be diversified. Yeomanry, wage contract, share 
contract and fixed rental contract have their own conditions of compatibility.  
Among the factors that have possible influences toward the selection of land ownership 
structure, two categories of factors are discussed in this paper. One is the factors that affect land 
investment return. Usually, the higher land investment returns rate are, the stronger landlords’ 
willing of investment will be, so the higher tenancy rate will be. The quantitative analysis 
shows that the tenancy rates had positive correlation with commercialization degree of 
agricultural products, and negative correlation with transportation costs, in different places in 
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pre-modern China. The other is land ownership scale and land operational scale. The 
quantitative analysis shows that both in southern and in northern China in the 1930s, tenancy 
rates had negative correlation with average land ownership scale, and negative correlation with 
operational scale per unit labor.  
By comparing the household sizes, land operational scales and farm earnings of tenant farms 
and yeoman farms in 1920s and 1930s , through different sources of data and in different 
places, this paper finds that tenant farms was sometimes more advanced than yeoman farms. In 
most cases, semi-tenants, who crop their own land and also rent others’ land, had larger sizes of 
family, larger scales of farm and more earning than yeomen and pure tenants. A considerable 
portion of rich farmers were semi-tenants.  
The reasons why tenancy had its competitive advantages in pre-modern China are then 
discussed. First, tenancy system enabled the separation of the investment function and the 
production function of land, thus lowered the cost for both tillers and land investors. Second, it 
adjusted the difference between land ownership scale and land operational scale. These two 
scales were determined in different mechanisms, and tenancy system enabled land operational 
scale not to be restricted by land ownership scale. Third, it realizes the selection of tillers.  
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